Most of the quantum authentication protocols are used to authenticate quantum messages. In this paper, by using a pair of non-entangled qubits, a quantum authentication protocol of classical messages is proposed. In the pair of qubits, the first one is used to carry a bit message, and the second one is used as a tag to authenticate the classical message. In our protocol, a bit string instead of a sequence of maximally entangled states is used directly as an authentication key, so the authentication key can be easily stored offline. On the other hand, in our protocol, a unitary operation UA is chosen to encrypt the qubits so that the successful probability of all attacks analyzed is less than one. Our quantum authentication protocol is secure against various attacks such as the no-message attack and message attacks.
Introduction
During the network communication, the message authentication is very important. A secure message authentication protocol can be used to ensure the legitimacy of the transmitted data as well as the communicating parties. In general, both digital signatures [1, 2] and message authentication codes (MACs) [3] have the function of authenticating the classical messages. However, the security of traditional digital signatures and MACs depend on some unproven assumptions concerning the computational complexity of some algorithms and the selection of hash functions. With the development of quantum computing technology, the security of these unproven mathematical assumptions and hash functions is facing a great challenge [4, 5] .
Compared with the traditional digital signatures and MACs, quantum authentication protocols [6, 7] , whose security are based on fundamental properties of quantum mechanics instead of on unproven mathematical assumptions, seem more secure and attractive. Now, the quantum authentication has become an important research subject in quantum cryptography [8] .
In the past few years, many quantum authentication protocols have been proposed to authenticate quantum messages [7, [9] [10] [11] [12] . However, in the communication world, classical messages are widely used. So, it is more important to study the quantum authentication of classical messages. The only quantum authentication protocol of classical message was proposed by Curty et al [6] . In Curty et al's protocol, the message sender and receiver shared a maximally entangled two-qubit In this paper, a new quantum authentication protocol of classical messages is proposed. Compared with Curty et al's protocol, in our protocol, the maximally entangled two-qubit AB   | is not directly used as the authentication key. In fact, the message sender and receiver share a bit string as their authentication key. Only when the classical message is authenticated will the authentication key be encoded into a sequence of two-qubit maximally entangled states. So, the authentication key can be easily kept offline. To authenticate one bit of classical message, two non-entangled qubits (|b>, |c>) instead of a maximally entangled state are transmitted. Because the transmitted quantum qubits are nonorthogonal, they are indistinguishable. This makes that the disturbance on the quantum channel can be detected with a certain probability. Our protocol is secure against various kinds of attacks such as the no-message attack and message attacks.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we propose our new quantum authentication protocol of classical messages. In Section 3, we analyze the security of the proposed protocol against various attacks. In Section 4, we discuss the selection of unitary operations. In Section 5, we conclude.
New Construction of Quantum Authentication of Classical Messages
Assume Alice and Bob share a bit string s=s1s2…si…, which can be distributed by executing the quantum key distribution protocol in [8] . The bit string s is used as the authentication key offline. Now, Alice wants to send a certified classical message to Bob. The goal is to make Bob confident about the authenticity of the message and sender. When the classical message is authenticated, Alice encodes the key string s into a sequence of two-qubit maximally entangled states |s1>, |s2>… where
This sequence of two-qubit maximally entangled states can be seen as the authentication key online. Only when a binary message m is authenticated, will the key string s be encoded into the authentication key online. On the other hand, in our protocol, all the encoding and decoding algorithms can be public.
Assume the classical message to be authenticated is a bit string m=m1m2…mi…, where mi∈ {0, 1}. Then the key string s is encoded into a sequence of two-qubit maximally entangled states |s1>, |s2>, …, |si>,…, where
Alice and Bob share the sequence |s1>, |s2>, …, |si>,…, as their authentication key online. For any maximally entangled state |si>, Alice and Bob own the first qubit and the second one, respectively. We call the state |si> the current key of Alice and Bob. On the other hand, in our protocol, a publicly known unitary operation UA, which must satisfy the requirements described in the Section 3, is used. For more details about UA, please refer to the Section 3.
Our authentication protocol includes two steps as follows.
Step 1. When Alice wants to send Bob a bit message mi∈ {0, 1}, she first prepares two qubits |a> and |b>, which are chosen from Table 1 , according to the message mi and her current key |si>. For example, suppose mi=0 and si=1. Then, according to Table 1 , 
on the qubit |a>. Assume the encrypted particle of |a> is |c>. The state of |c> is
. Then Alice sends the two qubits (|b>, |c>) to Bob.
Step 2. Once Bob receives the two qubits (|b>, |c>), he first checks his current key bit si. According to Table 1 on his parts of |si> and |c>. Then, Bob checks the current key bits si and chooses correct orthogonal bases from Table 2. After that, Bob performs an orthogonal measurement on the decrypted |c> by using the orthogonal bases. If the result of such a measurement is the same as the result of the measurement on |b>, Bob will accept the received binary message, or Bob will reject it. 
From the protocol described above, it is found that the measurements are performed on the orthogonal states, so the correctness of our protocol can be proved easily.
Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of our protocol under forgery attacks. For the forgery attacks, we mainly consider two kinds of attacks: no-message attack and message attacks.
No-message Attack
The no-message attack is that, before Alice's sending any quantum message to Bob, Eve attempts to prepare two quantum states (|b>, |c>) so as to they can be accepted by Bob. Assume Eve prepares two normalized pure quantum states (|b>, |c>), and sends them to Bob. Her goal is to make the pair (|b>, |c>) pass the verification of Bob, then Bob will believe that the messages come from Alice. When Bob receives the two qubits, he cannot know that they come from a forger, so he executes the step 2 of the protocol and decodes
Then, according to the step 2 of the protocol, Bob checks his key bits si, and makes two corresponding orthogonal measurements. Then we can obtain the probability Pf that Eve deceives Bob, where this case, similarly, we can get the same Pf as equation (5) . Then, then we can also obtain Pf<0.854. From the discussion above, it is known that the successful probability Pf of forging one bit message under no-message attack is strictly less than one. Then, the successful probability of forging a classical message with λ bits is less than (Pf) λ , where λ is a security parameter.
Message Attacks
There are two kinds of message attacks, TPCP map and measurement attack. In the first kind of attack called TPCP map, instead of directly forging quantum messages and sending them to Bob, Eve will wait for Alice's original messages and try to manipulate them. Her goal is to convert authentic messages into others so as to pass the verification of Bob. So, for our protocol, Eve tries to convert (|b>, |c>) into (|b'>, |c'>) so that the tampered pair can pass the verification of Bob. Then, based on the knowledge of all the public aspects of the quantum authentication, Eve determines two unitary quantum operations and applies them to the two particles sent by Alice.
In the second kind of attack, called measurement attack, Eve tries to extract the information of authentication key by performing some measurements on the transmitted particles in the quantum channel. Especially, if Eve can extract the information of authentication key from the results of the measurements, she may prepare some forged messages, which can pass the verification of Bob. attack, instead of performing predetermined quantum operations on the particles sent by Alice, Eve makes measurements on (|b>, |c>) and attempts to get some information about the authentication key. According to 
Discussion
In Section 3, we analyze all kinds of attacks, which must be considered, and present the requirements for the unitary operation UA avoiding the success of the attacks. We have shown that, in order to avoid the message attacks, Alice and Bob should agree to choose UA so that the condition (11) (12) so that the condition (11) is not satisfied. But, how to find the optimum UA, so that the successful probability of all attacks for the protocol is as little as possible, is still an open problem.
Conclusions
In this paper, a new quantum authentication protocol of classical messages is proposed. In our protocol, a bit string is used as the authentication key, which can be easily kept offline. Only when a classical message is authenticated will the authentication key be encoded into a sequence of two-qubit maximally entangled states. To authenticate a bit message, two qubits are transmitted, and a quantum encrypting scheme is used, too. Because the transmitted qubits are nonorthogonal, they are indistinguishable. This can guarantee any forgery or invalid measurement of the transmitted particles will be detected with a certain probability. Our protocol can be proved to be secure against various attacks such as no-message attack and message attacks.
